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ABSTRACT
Tasks in the real world are complex in nature and often require multiple robots to collab-
orate in order to be accomplished. However, multiple robots with the same set of sensors
working together might not be the optimal solution. In many cases a task might require
different sensory inputs and outputs. However, allocating a large variety of sensors on
each robot is not a cost-effective solution. As such, robots with different attributes must
be considered. In this thesis we study the coalition formation problem for task allocation
with multiple heterogeneous (equipped with a different set of sensors) robots. The pro-
posed solution is implemented utilizing a Hedonic Coalition Formation strategy, rooted
in game theory, coupled with bipartite graph matching. Our proposed algorithm aims to
minimize the total cost of the formed coalitions and to maximize the matching between
the required and the allocated types of robots to the tasks. Simulation results show that
it produces near-optimal solutions (up to 94%) in a negligible amount of time (0.19 ms.
with 100 robots and 10 tasks).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As humans, we often collaborate to complete a given task where participants bring po-
tentially different skill sets to the table. Similar to the humans, in order to complete a
task in an autonomous fashion, multiple robots with different abilities need to collabo-
rate. The abilities of the robots depend on their on-board sensors (e.g., laser rangefinder
for map building) and their available actuators (e.g., manipulators for object manip-
ulation). Combining the sensory inputs and corresponding actuation, one robot can
contribute towards completing a given task. In this paper, we study how a group of
heterogeneous robots, i.e., having different sets of sensors and/or actuators, can form
teams (or, coalitions) to complete a given set of tasks such that the cost of forming the
coalitions is minimized and the value of the formed coalitions is maximized. In litera-
ture, this problem is known as Single Task, Multi-Robot Instantaneous task allocation
problem (ST-MR-IA) [SA11, ZP13] – a robot can be allocated to a single task at any
given time, however, multiple robots can be allocated to a particular task. Finding the
optimal solution for this problem is shown to be an NP-Hard problem [SA11, SK95]
although many approximation solutions with provable worst-case performance bounds
exist [DA19, SA11, SK95].
Multi-robot coalition formation for task allocation has many potential real-world ap-
plications ranging from warehouse management to environmental monitoring. The ob-
jective is to partition the set of robots into non-overlapping subsets (coalitions), each
of which will be allocated to a unique task and the member robots will then cooperate
with each other to accomplish the allocated task. Within this thesis, we deal with the
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partitioning problem: Given a set of n robots and m tasks, how to form m coalitions
such that some given criterion (e.g., utility of the coalitions) is optimized. The required
numbers and types of robots to complete a given task is assumed to be known a priori.
To solve this stated problem, we use a well-established game theoretic concept, called
hedonic coalition game [BJ02]. The word ‘hedonic’ is originated from the greek word ‘
he¯doniko´s’ that means ‘considered in terms of pleasant’. In a pure hedonic setting, each
robot will consider joining a particular coalition if the experience of joining the coali-
tion is ‘pleasant’, e.g., the robot’s sensors are maximally utilized and the cost of moving
to the coalition is also low. To form a set of m non-overlapping hedonic coalitions,
we have used a weighted bipartite graph matching technique along with an intelligent
switch rule that make the formed coalitions provably Nash-stable. To achieve a Nash-
Stable environment, each robot must be satisfied in their given coalition. That is, no
robot seeks to relocate to another coalition in an effort to improve its utility. To the best
of our knowledge, this paper is the first to solve the coalition formation problem for task
allocation with a group of heterogeneous robots using a hedonic coalition game formu-
lation. Simulation results validate the theoretically proved stable nature of our solutions.
The results show that our proposed algorithm can consistently yield near-optimal solu-
tions (up to 94%).
Furthermore, we have compared our proposed approach with four previous approaches
developed to provide an approximation solution to the heterogeneous coalition forma-
tion problem. Our approach is compared to two natural greedy heuristics: MaxUtility
and AverageUtility. MaxUtility was first presented in [SA11] and further explored along
with AverageUtility in [ZP13]. To improve upon these two solutions [ZP13] proposed
two new solutions to the ST-MR-IA problem: ResourceCentric and ResourceCentri-
cApprox. We implemented similar solutions to the above mention approaches, altered
3
slightly to adapt to the nature of the problem and models presented in this thesis. The
comparison of the results revealed similar solutions in terms of the ratio to the opti-
mal, however, our solution proved to be significantly faster when compared to all four
algorithms. Of the four MaxUtility had the fastest run times, but our solution was up
to 41 times faster for the given experiment settings. The slowest was ResourceCentric.
With a setting ofm = 4 and n = 12, our solution was approximately 44,500 times faster.
Lastly, we implemented our proposed approach on a real TurtleBot 3 robot having a
Raspberry Pi 3 computing board that is intended to reflect a more realistic environment
in which the proposed solution would run on. It could find a solution for 100 robots and
10 task in .322 seconds.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
To service complex tasks, autonomous robots can work together where each robot can
offer a particular set of skills best suited to completing different sub-parts of a task. To
best service a task, the robots must form a team in which their collective skills are well-
suited to the needs of the task. Coalition formation has received significant attention and
a number of studies have been conducted by economists and computer scientists alike.
Earlier studies primarily dealt with a set of homogeneous agents, while more recently,
studies have expanded to address environments with heterogeneous agents.
2.1 Task Allocation
One of the earliest studies on coalition formation of agents for task allocation is pre-
sented in [SK98]. Their work yielded algorithms with polynomial-complexity of a dis-
tributive greedy nature providing near-optimal solutions to the homogeneous task allo-
cation program. Their work also included consideration for task with precedence order.
The authors’ algorithm guaranteed to find a solution within a factor of (k + 1) of the
optimal solution, where k is the maximum size of any coalition formed and returned
results in less than a minute in a system of up to 60 agents.
Other early studies, providing solutions with homogeneous agents, can be seen in [RJ08].
The authors provide an optimal solution to the coalition generation problem utilizing
dynamic programming. The primary motivation of this work is provide a solution that
reduces the memory used in previous approaches. The resulting algorithm has an ex-
ponential time complexity of O(3n). Additionally in [RRDJ07], the authors employ a
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search-based technique to find a near-optimal solution. The solution generates valid and
unique coalition structures and implements a technique to reduce the search space in
which they cycle through to find a near-optimal coalition structure. Their results found
a solution up to 99% of the optimal for up to 20 agents. More recent studies include
the research performed in [DUA19] and [DA19]. In [DUA19] a correlation cluster-
ing technique is utilized to provide a near-optimal solution. The solution applies linear
programming to correlate robots to clusters of high similarity using cost and value func-
tions. Experiments find near-optimal solutions for up to 100 robots. [DA19] proposes a
variant of a classical weighted bipartite matching technique for the allocation of homo-
geneous robots. The proposed approach can provide similar near-optimality guarantee
as [SK98, SA11] while providing a linear time-complexity as opposed to state-of-the-
art polynomial solutions. This model is the primary motivation for using the weighted
bipartite matching-based hedonic coalition formation solution proposed in this paper al-
beit for heterogeneous robots.
In real world situations, the complexity of tasks may require more than one type of
robot, or robots that offer different capabilities. With this, consideration has been given
to the heterogeneous task allocation problem. The work presented in [SA11] provide
two solutions for the coalition formation problem. One for a homogeneous environment
and the other for a heterogeneous environment. For the former, a dynamic program-
ming based algorithm is introduced which can find an optimal solution in polynomial
time. For the latter, the authors present an adjusted solution of the algorithm proposed
in [SK98]. Their solution offers a polynomial solution with a complexity of (O(n
3
2m)),
which improves upon Shehory and Kraus’s solution with a complexity of O(nkm); ex-
ponential on the size of the largest coalition. However, both [SA11, SK98] report similar
sub-optimality guarantees. In [ZP13], the authors examine two natural greedy heuris-
tics for the coalition formation problem within a heterogeneous environment, and then
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present an improved heuristic in which inter-task resource constraints are taken into
account as well as expected loss of utility. An extension of the new heuristic is also
provided to incorporate task dependencies. The studies performed in [LV12a, LV12b]
propose a synergy graph to model the compatibility of agents. In [LV12a] a coalition
formation algorithm with heterogeneous agents is proposed where agents learn about
the capabilities of other agents over time and form better coalitions. Here, a synergy
graph is used to model how compatible any two agents are to form a coalition. The
solution offered takes a learning approach where the synergy graph developed is built
using training observations. A similar synergy-graph model is used in [LV12b] to study
role assignments of ad-hoc agents in a coalition. Here, the authors study an environment
in which capabilities of the robots and their performance on a team is initially unknown.
The research presented in [DCAU19] proposes a distributed bipartite graph partitioning
approach with region growing to provide near-optimal solutions for the ST-MR-IA task
allocation problem. First, the authors divide the bipartite graph into k sub-problems
correlating to the k agent types. The sub-graphs are processed to allocate agents of the
same type to tasks. The graph partitioning approach is employed to keep edges of sim-
ilar end points–an agent task pairing–with edges weights to signify the suitability of an
agent/task pairing. Region growing is then performed to either add to a coalition that
requires more agents or remove unnecessary agents from a coalition. Furthermore, the
work provides an expansion to solve for the ST-MR-TD task problem and considers
inter-task dependencies. In [LCS14], the authors consider the heterogeneous task al-
location problem for grouped tasks and present an auction-based solution to maximize
payoff or minimize cost. The study done in [SPP18] considers the capacity-constrained
vehicle routing problem as the base model for the ST-MR-IA and provides a scalable
heuristic handling up to 400 robots and 2000 tasks in simulations.
Additional complexities to the heterogeneous task allocation problem such as uncertain
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costs have also been taken into account. Uncertainty is captured in the edge costs of
transport graphs in [Pro19]. The authors use redundant robots to combat the uncertainty
of travel times with the goal of reducing the waiting times at the desired goal loca-
tion. They present a polynomial time algorithm using distributive aggregate functions
to assign redundant robots to paths to minimize average waiting time. The research in
[NS17] considers uncertain costs and risk levels associated with unknown settings such
as surface topology. The authors consider two approaches. One solution allows the input
of risk tolerance preference and this risk affects the optimal assignment. In the second,
the risk position does not affect the optimal assignment.
2.2 Hedonic Games
The concept of hedonic Games, originally presented by [DG80] found its first appli-
cations in economics. Specifically the idea that individuals form teams to accomplish
activities, and the motivation for an individual to join a team is based on preferences.
Since then a number of studies have been conducted to further define and understand
hedonic games and its applications. The work in [BJ02] is a primary example of one
of the earlier studies researching the stability of coalition structures in hedonic games.
In this work, the authors review the settings for hedonic and non-hedonic situations and
the existence of stability in hedonic settings. They focus primarily on core stability and
individual stability. Further studies have continued to research stability and complexity
which can be found in [GS10] and [AB12]. In the former, the authors research compu-
tational complexity when achieving stable results. They consider hedonic games with
additively-separable utilities and different stable outcomes such as Nash and individual
stability. The latter study further explores the existence of stability in hedonic coalition
formation. In this work, we observe the consideration of a player’s preference of one
coalition over another. The work offers solutions considering preference restrictions and
guarantee existence of stable outcomes.
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A sub-set of hedonic games known as Fractional Hedonic Games has also amassed a
decent amount of attention. The studies presented in [ABH14] focus on the applications
and stability of fractional hedonic games. In a fractional hedonic game, the utility is
an average value a player credits the others in the coalition. Here the authors present
algorithms to compute a core stable outcome for a fractional hedonic game. The work
presented in [BFF+14, BFF+18] also considers fractional hedonic games and provides
various graph topologies in order to model these games and their complexities when
aiming to achieve a Nash stable outcome.
Game theory has previously been used for robot planning problems [LH93]. How-
ever, specifically proposing hedonic games for multi-robot systems appears to have re-
ceived less attention. Recent works, done in the last decade by Saad et al. presented in
[SHB+09, SHB+10, SHB+11] focuses on using hedonic games to produce self-forming
coalitions in different multi-agent systems. These systems include unmanned air ve-
hicles, wireless communication agents, and secondary base station corporation in cog-
nitive radio networks. The primary approach of the thesis was motivated by the work
presented in [SHB+09, SHB+10, SHB+11]. However, the problem addressed in the the-
sis will work with heterogeneous robots. The solution also aims to reduce the number
of preference relations built in [SHB+09, SHB+10, SHB+11].
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CHAPTER 3
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Over the past few decades, increasing attention has been given to multi-robot systems.
It is becoming increasingly common to see cooperative multi-robot systems being uti-
lized in real-world day-to-day tasks[GM04]. Within cooperative multi-robots systems
lies the problem of multi-robot task allocation. The core focus of this thesis has studied
the Single Task, Multi-Robot, Instantaneous Allocation problem (ST-MR-IA) with het-
erogeneous robots. The problem studies coalition formation of multiple robots assigned
to service a specific task. Each task requires a set of sensors for it to complete success-
fully. A robot’s set of sensors, when combined with sensors from other robots, works
cooperatively together to complete a task. The set of sensors a robot has is considered
the value it can offer a task. The value of a coalition assigned to a task considers the col-
lective sensors of the robots within a coalition. When forming coalitions, cost also plays
an important role. The cost it takes for a robot to service a task is represented by the
distance traveled by the robot to get to the task. Traveling to a task not only uses battery
power but also contributes to the wear and tear of the robot. This impacts the overall
lifetime use of the robot. The value and cost are combined to form a utility function.
The utility function indicates how well a robot is suited to a task when considering other
robots in the coalition. The utility is then utilized by the Hedonic Coalition Formation
Game to create self-forming coalitions.
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3.1 Model and Notations
Let R = {r1, r2, · · · , rn} denote a set of n robots. Each robot ri has the following
attributes: position Pi and sensor/actuator set Sri where Sri = {s1, s2, . . . sk} denotes
a set of sensors/actuators for the robot ri. From here on, we will use the term sensors
to indicate the on-board sensors and/or actuators w.l.o.g. We assume that the robot’s
sensor set size |Sri| ≥ 1 and each robot cannot have multiple same sensor. It is also
assumed that each robot is localized in the environment using an on-board GPS or
an overhead camera. A set of m tasks are available in the environment denoted by
T = {t1, t2, . . . tm}. A task tj has the following attributes: position Pj and sensor
requirements Stj = {s1, s2, . . . sl} – a set of sensors that the task tj requires to be opti-
mally completed. Each task’s sensor set will adhere to |Stj | ≥ 1 as well, and a task can
require multiple sensors of the same type to be completed. Note that
⋃
m Stj ⊆ S and⋃
n Sri ⊆ S where S denotes the set of all possible sensors.
A coalition c ⊆ R is a group of robots assigned to complete a task. A coalition struc-
ture CS can be viewed as a set of disjoint coalitions, which cover all the robots. Let
CS = {c1, c2, . . . cm} denote a set of coalitions where each coalition is matched with a
single task and as such |CS| = |T |.
3.1.1 Value Function
This function determines the non-negative value a robot offers a task, i.e. how effective
that robot is in contributing to the needs of any particular task. In our scenario, the value
of a robot allocated to a task is defined by how many sensors the robot ri can contribute
to the task tj’s requirements. On the other hand, an unused sensor is a wasted resource
and therefore negatively affects the overall value a robot offers a task. The better value
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a robot can offer a task, the more likely the robot will choose that task to be assigned
to. The value function is a weighted formula of sensor matching and is defined as the
following:
val(ri, tj) =

bI − pO, if bI − pO > 0
0, otherwise
(3.1)
Where b is the benefit ascribed to I , which is the size of the common subset of sensors
belonging to ri and the task tj’s requirement set, i.e., I = |Sri ∩ Stj |. p is the penalty
received for each sensor not utilized, and O is a subset of sensors belonging to ri not
needed by the task, i.e., O = Sri \ (Sri ∩ Stj). If the result is negative, the value is set
to 0 indicating this robot offers no value to the task being considered. It is important
for the value to be non-negative in order to achieve a Nash-stable outcome [BFF+18].
Both b and p are constants, values of which can be changed depending on how much
desired benefit or penalty can be ascribed to the matching. For the purpose of this pa-
per we chose a baseline benefit and penalty of b = 1 and p = 0.1 for most simulations.
However, we are interested in how benefit and penalty work together and perform exper-
iments altering both b and p. The benefit and penalty weights work in delicate balance
with each other and can offer flexibility in the importance of matched and unused sen-
sors.
The penalty p should be chosen to avoid a negative value(·, ·). A penalty may only be
added if at least one sensor match is made, otherwise the value defaults to zero as defined
in Eq. 3.1. Therefore, the maximum value O can have is the max(|Sri|) − 1,∃ri ∈ R,
which we denote by max(O). As the robots do not have duplicate sensors (e.g., two
LIDARs), max(|Sri|) is equivalent to the number of sensor types. For example, with
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maximum of three sensor types,max(O) = 3−1. To ensure pO ≤ bI , the penalty value
must be: p ≤ bI
max(O)
where I ≥ 1. On the other hand, with b = 1 and max(O) = 2, the
upper bound on p is 0.5. It is important to note that While there is a maximum bound on
the penalty p, the value used for p is not required to be the maximum in all the cases.
The used value for p depends on the specifics of the application. The penalty is used to
aid in reducing wasted resources. If wasted resources cannot be tolerated, the penalty
should be set to its maximum. Depending on the number of sensor types, setting the
penalty to the maximum value may affect how close to the optimal the solution may
reach. Lowering the penalty will allow for more choice among the robots. In our prob-
lem where we consider three types of sensors, the maximum penalty of 0.5 gives it a
significant weight. This greatly restricts the robots from potentially relocating to a bet-
ter coalition. For most of the simulations the base penalty setting of p = 0.1 to allow
freer movement of robots to tasks.
3.1.2 Cost Function
For a robot to service an assigned task, the robot must travel to the task location to
complete it. When a robot considers coalitions to join, it must consider the cost to travel
to its chosen task. Travel not only impacts battery life but also overall wear and tear of
the robot. Therefore, it is an important factor to consider in the formulation. For our
scenario the cost is determined by the distance traveled. With self-forming coalitions,
the cost function will aid the robots in deciding if they want to stay in their current
coalitions, or if other coalitions are preferred based on how far they have to travel to
reach the tasks. The cost function is motivated from [DUA19] and defined as:
cost(ri, tj) = 1−
(
d(ri, tj)√
length2 + width2 + 1
)
(3.2)
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Where d denotes the euclidean distance between a robot and a task and length and
width are the dimensions of the environment. Similar to the value function, we subtract
this from 1 to avoid negative cost amount to be used in the utility function described
below.
3.1.3 Utility Function
The utility function indicates overall how well a robot fits within its coalition in terms
of value and cost. When a robot considers a coalition it will use the utility metric to
determine how well it is suited to service the task. The higher the utility the better
suited the robot is to the task be considered. It is defined as:
u(ri, tj) = val(ri, tj) + cost(ri, tj) (3.3)
To follow the hedonic coalition game model, each robot’s utility must solely depend on
the members of the coalition [BJ02]. To adhere to this property a robot ri’s value can
only be determined based on the other robots in the coalition under consideration as ri
must take into account the other robots’ sensors contributed to the coalition as well as
the task as it defines the sensors needed in that coalition.
3.1.4 Problem Objective
The objective is to have self-forming set of coalitions where the final coalition structure
maximizes the utility. The utility of the coalition structure is the sum of utilities of all
the robots allocated to coalitions and is defined as follows:
u(CS) =
m∑
j=1
|cj |∑
i=1
u(ri, tj)
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The objective of the coalition formation problem for multi-robot task allocation is to
find a coalition structure CS∗ that offers the maximum utility and it can be formally
represented as follows:
CS∗ = argmax
CS∈ζ
u(CS)
where ζ denotes the set of all possible coalition structures. After an initial allocation,
each robot will consider other coalitions in the CS and choose a task, if necessary, in
order to increase its utility. This will result in a final Nash-stable coalition structure.
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CHAPTER 4
HEDONIC COALITION FORMATION GAME
Hedonic games were first established as a way to model economic situations in which we
can observe the natural instinct of individuals to partition themselves into groups they
identify as most beneficial given a set of properties [DG80]. The study of hedonic games
has evolved beyond economics and has found usefulness in many topics of computer
science, specifically coalition formation. In these situations, the agents (robots in our
case) have a preference as to which coalition they wish to belong to [BFF+18]. Some
examples of situations are social groups, political parties, organizations etc. An agent’s
motivation to belong to a coalition can be quantified by its utility. The utility is only
dependent on the other members within the coalition [BJ02]. One such example is a
political party. Here, a member’s utility depends on the party’s values and identities of
other members [BFF+18]. Within a hedonic game, the goal for an agent is to improve its
utility by choosing a coalition that maximizes said utility. This approach presents itself
to be greedy in nature where an agent chooses a coalition based information known
at specific stage within the algorithm. To establish our solution as hedonic, it must
follow the properties for hedonic coalition formation. We formalize these by defining
the following key properties [BJ02, SHB+11]:
1. Utility of a robot depends solely on the other robots in the coalition the robot
currently belongs to.
2. The coalitions are formed based on the preferences the robots have over the set of
all possible coalitions.
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The concept of Nash stability states that a coalition structure CS is stable if there exists
no robot that can improve its utility by moving to another coalition in CS. Simply
put, all robots have maximized their utility and are in the coalitions they most prefer.
Our objective in this work is to follow the properties of the hedonic model to build
self-forming coalitions and form a final coalition structure that is Nash-stable, which is
formally defined next [SHB+11].
Definition 1 A coalition structure CS is Nash-stable if ∀ r ∈ R, c′(ri) ri c ∪ {ri} for
all c ∈ CS ∪ {∅}
To form such coalitions, we utilize concepts presented in [BFF+18, DA19] focusing on
solutions based on bipartite matching. To model the coalitions, we use an undirected,
weighted bipartite graph unlike the unweighted graph model used in [BFF+18]. We
first perform a matching on a bipartite graph modeled with the robots and the tasks.
Thereafter, we give the robots the opportunity to improve their utilities by relocating to
different coalitions as discussed next1.
4.1 Maximum Bipartite Graph Matching
We begin with a maximum weighted bipartite matching formulation to establish initial
coalitions where exactly one robot is assigned to each task. Although we have used the
classical weighted bipartite matching algorithm (Algorithm 1) presented in [MB07], any
other weighted matching algorithm can be used it its place.
We define our undirected, weighted bipartite graph as G = ({V, U}, E,W ). V and U
are two sets of vertices where V represents the robots and U represents the tasks. E is
the set of all possible edges between u − v pairs where u ∈ U, v ∈ V . W is the set
of edge weights. The weight of an edge is the utility between a robot-task pair and as
1The presented algorithm here has been published in [CD19]
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mentioned earlier, it is calculated using Eq. 3.3. Let M ⊆ E denote the set of edges
that do not share any end vertices. Algorithm 1 will produce such an edge set, called
matching, which is also the maximum in size.
Algorithm 1: Weighted Maximum Bipartite Matching
Input: G({V, U}, E,W ): A weighted bipartite graph
where V = set of robots and U = set of tasks
Output: M : a weighted maximum matching.
1 for each v ∈ V do
2 Sv ← U ;
3 M ← ∅;
4 TA ← ∅;
5 for each u ∈ U do
6 v ← bm(u);
7 if bm(u) = v then
8 /*u and v are mutually best for each other*/
9 M ←M ∪ {u, v};
10 TA ← TA ∪ {u, v};
11 while TA 6= ∅ do
12 u← end vertex ∈ U from an edge in TA;
13 TA = TA \ {u, v′} where {u, v′} ∈M ;
14 for each u ∈ Sv where u is unmatched do
15 if bm(bm(u)) = u then
16 TA = TA ∪ {u, bm(u)};
17 M =M ∪ {u, bm(u)};
18 return M ;
Algorithm 1 will take each task and match it to a robot where the robot-task matching
is mutually best for each other. A mutually best robot-task pair means the edge {u, v}
is the maximum weighted edge among all edges incident to u and v. First, for each
v ∈ V we obtain the potential matches and store in Sv (lines 1− 2). We initialize Sv to
U because initially, every u ∈ U is a potential match. We initialize M to an empty set.
While there are tasks remaining to be matched to a robot, for each such task, we find a
mutually best robot pairing (lines 8− 9). Once a robot-task pair is found to be mutually
best for each other, they are added to M . This matched pair is also added to the set TA
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so that it can be used later for assigning other tasks. After matching the initial set of
mutually best robot-task pairs, the remaining unmatched tasks are assigned in a similar
fashion (lines 11− 17). This process terminates when each task is assigned exactly one
robot to it as m < n. At this stage, the maximum matching creates the initial set of
coalitions. However, all the robots might not have been allocated to some tasks at this
stage.
4.2 Hedonic Coalition Formation Algorithm
After the initial maximum weighted matching is found, we use that for the final hedonic
coalition formation where a robot may choose to leave its current coalition for another if
doing so will increase its utility. We first create the initial coalition structure, i.e., where
each robot is assigned to exactly one task. Next, the robots with improving deviations
consider moving to other coalitions when there is an opportunity to do so.
4.2.1 Improving Deviation
A robot ri has an improving deviation if ri can improve its utility by leaving its current
coalition c and moving to another coalition c′ [BFF+18]. Any robot with an improving
deviation will belong to a set defined as RID = {r1, r2, . . . rN} where RID ⊆ R.
To develop self-forming coalitions a robot ri with an improving deviation will choose a
coalition to relocate to based on preference. Therefore, for a robot considering reloca-
tion, we define a preference relation between itself and all other coalitions. We define
the preference relation as follows:
c1 ri c2 ↔ uri(c1) ≥ uri(c2) (4.1)
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In layman’s terms, a robot ri will strictly or equally prefer coalition c1 over c2 iff ri’s
utility associated to c1 is greater than or equal to ri’s utility in c2. The preference relation
is specific to some robot ri and accordingly we denote the preference as ri . In our
approach, only one robot may change coalitions at a time. This robot will have the
lowest edge weight i.e. the lowest utility among the robots inRID. The robot in question
will define a preference relation for itself by considering all possible coalitions in the
current CS.
4.2.2 Moving to a New Coalition
After the robot with the lowest edge weight in RID generates a preference relation be-
tween itself and the current coalitions in the CS, it will join another coalition that in-
creases its utility. A robot ri will leave its coalition by using the following a switch rule,
similar to that of [SHB+11]: Given a coalition structure CS = {c1, c2, . . . cm}, the can-
didate robot ri ∈ RID will leave its coalition c and join another coalition c′, if and only
if c′ ∪ {ri} ri c. We extend the unweighted hedonic coalition formation algorithm in
[BFF+18] to a weighted setting and form hedonic coalitions.
Algorithm 2 defines the pseudo-code for coalition formation using principles in frac-
tional hedonic games. Given an undirected weighted bipartite graph the algorithm will
return a Nash-stable coalition structure CS. It will begin by first computing a weighted
maximum matching defined in Algorithm 1. The matching returned by Algorithm 1
establishes the initial set of m coalitions (line 4). Next, for each robot (v) not yet in a
coalition, it will select a task using a greedy methodology. A robot will allocate itself
to a task by selecting the edge between itself and some task (u) such that the edge is
the maximum value for that robot among all potential tasks. This will continue until
all robots have a task allocation (lines 5 − 8). This provides an initial CS where each
robot is allocated to some task. Finally, the algorithm selects the robot in RID, the set
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Algorithm 2: Hedonic Coalition Formation
Input: R: A set of Robots; T : A set of Tasks
Output: CS: A Final Coalition Structure
1 Create the bipartite graph G({V, U}, E,W );
2 M ←Weighted maximum matching from Algorithm 1;
3 CS ← ∅;
4 Covered← Set of all robots part of M ;
5 for each v 6∈ Covered do
6 choose u ∈ U | {u, v} ∈ E and wu,v ≥ wu′,v ∀ u′ 6= u;
7 cu ← cu ∪ v;
8 Covered← Covered ∪ v;
9 Update CS;
10 Compute the set of robots with Improving Deviation, RID;
11 while RID 6= ∅ do
12 Select ri ∈ RID with lowest edge weight;
13 ri considers switch operations using the preference relation calculated in Eq.
4.1;
14 ri selects a coalition using the switch rule;
15 Update CS;
16 return CS;
of robots with improving deviations, with the minimum edge weight allows this robot
to move to another coalition using the switch rule. The robot will leave its coalition
and choose the coalition that maximizes its utility, i.e., the task that has the highest edge
weight for that specific robot. The current coalition structure CS is thereby updated.
When the set RID is empty, i.e., no robot can improve its utility by moving coalitions,
CS is considered stable and the final coalition structure CS is returned. The final coali-
tion structure can be considered Nash-stable and the proof of stability is described in the
research performed in [BFF+18]. After the final CS is formed, the robots will move to
their allocated tasks. Inter-robot collisions can be avoided while minimally increasing
the initially estimated path lengths by using techniques proposed in [DD17].
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4.2.3 Discussion on Complexity
Time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(mn) [MB07]. If an optimal algorithm for max-
imum bipartite matching such as Hungarian [Kuh55] is used instead, the complexity
would become O(max(m,n)3).
The time complexity of Algorithm 2 would primarily depend on lines 2, 5−8, and 10−
15. As discussed above, line 2 will incur a complexity ofO(mn). Lines 5− 8 will incur
a time complexity of O(n) as all the robots are unassigned at this point in the worst
case scenario. Complexity of line 10 in Algorithm 2 is O(mn) as each robot will check
whether it can improve its utility by moving to any of the existing coalitions, the maxi-
mum count of which is m. As the RID set can maximally have n robots in it and each
robot ri ∈ RID will be checking for the switch, lines 11− 15 will incur a complexity of
O(mn). Thus, the worst-case time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(mn).
Now, we compare time complexity of our approach with that of the four existing state-
of-the-art algorithms in 4.1. C denotes the total number of coalitions (= 2n) possible
with n robots. Therefore, it should be noted that all these algorithms will incur a high,
exponential time complexity whereas our proposed hedonic game-based coalition for-
mation approach incurs only a polynomial time complexity. This helps our algorithm to
be highly scalable whereas the compared state-of-the-art algorithms can not handle more
than only tens of robots. One should also note that ResourceCentricApprox algorithm
[ZP13] also incurs high space complexities due to the fact that it creates numerous hash
tables to store and track coalitions with resource constraints. As the number of coali-
tions (C) grows exponentially with n, they will incur exponential space complexities.
On the other hand, our proposed method does not take this approach and requires only
polynomial space (O(mn)). These practical implications are also demonstrated in the
next section.
22
Table 4.1: Summary of time complexity comparison
Algorithm Reference Complexity
Average Utility [SA11, SK98, ZP13] O(min(m,n) ·mC)
Max Utility [SA11, SK98, ZP13] O(min(m,n) ·mC)
ResourceCentric [ZP13] O(min(m,n) ·m2C2)
ResourceCentricApprox [ZP13] O(min(m,n) ·m2nC)
Our approach this paper O(mn)
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Settings
We have implemented our proposed hedonic coalition formation algorithm using the
Java programming language. The tests were run on a laptop with an Intel i7− 3615QM
processor and 16GB RAM. The number of robots (n) has been varied between [4, 100],
and the number of tasks (m) has been varied between [2, 10]. We have made sure that
in no test case the number of tasks exceeds 50% of the number of robots used. The
distinct 2D locations of the robots and the tasks are randomly generated from a bounded
square area with sides of length 100m. The total number of possible sensors (|S|) was
set to 3 and the sensor distribution was randomly generated for both robots and tasks.
To begin, robots received a random combination between one and three unique sensors.
To determine how many sensors each task would receive, the sum of sensors among the
robots was randomly partitioned based on the number of tasks in the environment. The
sum of each type of sensor given to the robots was used to randomly generate the sensor
requirements of the tasks. This results in an environment where the tasks have sensor
requirements that can be filled by the robots in the environment. Each setting was run
20 times with an average result calculated and illustrated in the graphs in the results
section. The bars in the plots indicate the maximum and the minimum value obtained
for any particular metric.
We have compared the performance of our algorithm against four previous approaches.
The first two approaches – MaxUtility and AverageUtility – implemented for compari-
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son are greedy algorithms developed in [SK98] as well as modifications of this approach
in [SA11] and [ZP13]. In both algorithms – beginning with the first task – all coalitions
of a size equal to that of the robot requirement for the given task are generated. Then
each candidate coalition is evaluated. With MaxUtility the total utility of the coalition
is considered. The alternate approach – AverageUtility – considers the average utility of
the candidate coalition. Given that the goal is to maximize utility, the candidate coalition
with the highest utility (Max Utility), or highest average (Average Utility) is assigned to
the task being considered in greedy fashion. The task and robots are then removed from
consideration and the process repeats with remaining tasks and robots.
The other two solutions implemented for comparison are developed in [ZP13]. The
ResourceCentric and ResourceCentricApprox are greedy heuristics that consider inter-
task resource constraints and an approximation of that heuristic to improve performance
respectively. For both, the first step is to generate all possible coalitions given a maxi-
mum size. In ResourceCentric, an undirected graph is generated where each node is a
coalition and edges are added where a conflict exists between two coalitions. A conflict
occurs when two coalitions contain the same task or robots as a task cannot be assigned
more than one set of robots and robots cannot be in multiple coalitions. After the graph
is generated, while the graph is not empty, for each coalition (node) and for each of
its neighbors a value ρ is calculated which is the utility of the coalition minus the sum
of the conflicting assignments multiplied by the utility of the neighbor coalition. The
coalition that maximizes ρ is selected and this coalition, its neighbors and connecting
neighbors are removed from the graph. The key differences in ResourceCentricApprox
as compared to ResourceCentric is an approximation of the calculation ρ and the use of
hash tables to track conflicts instead of an undirected graph.
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5.2 Results
A number of experiments were run to determine the overall quality and effectiveness
of the solutions. These experiments and their results are presented in the following
subsections.
5.2.1 Utility Comparisons
First, we are interested in the investigation of the approximation ratio (higher is better,
1 being the optimal solution) achieved by our proposed method to an optimal solution.
To this end, we have implemented a brute-force method [Orl02] to obtain the optimal
solution and we compute the ratio of our solution’s utility to that of the optimal solution.
The brute-force method employs the same cost, value, and utility calculations presented
in Chapter 3, Section 3.1. The result is presented in Fig. 5.1. This plot demonstrates
the near-optimal nature of our solutions. For example, with m = 2, the highest and the
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Figure 5.1: Approximation ratio to optimal
lowest approximation ratios obtained are 0.91 and 0.78 for n = 4 and 10 respectively.
The approximation ratios were quite similar with m = 4 as compared with m = 2, and
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we obtained an approximation ratio of 0.84 with n = 8 and 0.79 with n = 12. This
experiment was run with a baseline benefit of 1.0 and penalty of 0.1. Improved utility
results were obtained with a different benefit and penalty and is explored further in sub-
section 5.2.2. Next we look at how well our solution performs in terms of ratio to the
optimal in comparison to the four additional greedy solutions implemented.
The result in comparing our approach to the MaxUtility solution is shown in Fig. 5.2.
Here we can observe that MaxUtility provided better solutions with m = 2, however
the solution degraded with m = 4 and our solution provided better results. The highest
approximation ratio for MaxUtility was 0.96 with m = 2 and n = 12, and the lowest
was 0.70 with m = 4 and n = 10.
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Figure 5.2: Approximation ratio to optimal (MaxUtility)
In Fig. 5.3, we view the results of our solution compared with AverageUtility. The
results show AverageUtility provided a lower quality solution in all settings than our
approach. The highest approximation ratio for AverageUtility was 0.86 with m = 2 and
n = 4, and the lowest was 0.53 with m = 4 and n = 12.
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Figure 5.3: Approximation ratio to optimal (AverageUtility)
Next we investigate the results when comparing our solution with the ResourceCentric
and ResourceCentricApprox heuristics. In Fig. 5.4, we observe the comparison of Re-
sourceCentric with our approach. This result illustrates that ResourceCentric provides
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Figure 5.4: Approximation ratio to optimal (Resource Centric)
a better solution in some cases with m = 2, but with m = 4, our approach provides
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a better solution. The highest approximation ratio for ResourceCentric was 0.89 with
m = 2 and n = 10, and the lowest was 0.66 with m = 4 and n = 10.
In Fig. 5.5, we compare ResourceCentricApprox with our solution. ResourceCentricAp-
prox, similarly to some of the earlier comparisons, resulted in better solutions at m = 2.
However, did not perform as well as approach for m = 4. The highest approximation
ratio for ResourceCentricApprox was 0.94 with m = 2 and n = 6, and the lowest was
0.70 with m = 4 and n = 10.
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Figure 5.5: Approximation ratio to optimal (Resource Centric Approx.)
Following [DA19], we are also interested to investigate how many times out of the 20
simulation runs, we get a good solution, i.e., at least 80% of the optimal. The result is
presented in Fig. 5.6. We observe that form = 2, we can always achieve a solution 50%
of the time that is within 80% of the optimal. Similarly for m = 4, we are also able to
obtain a good solution in at least half of the simulation runs.
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Figure 5.6: Percentage of tests in which our proposed approach generated a coalition
structure with utilities 80% and 90% of the optimal.
In comparing our approach with the results achieved with MaxUtility as shown in Fig.
5.7, we see that MaxUtility outperforms our approach with m = 2, however does not
perform as well with m = 4. MaxUtility can achieve a solution that is within 80% of the
optimal 90% of the time, and at minimum 50% of the time within 90% of the optimal
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Figure 5.7: Percentage of tests in which the MaxUtility algorithm generated a coalition
structure with utilities 80% and 90% of the optimal.
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for m = 2. For m = 4, in most cases MaxUtility achieves solutions within 80% or 90%
of the optimal less than 30% of the time.
AverageUtility overall was completely outperformed by our approach. The result is pre-
sented in Fig. 5.8. In all scenarios save one, AverageUtility could not achieve solutions
within 80% or 90% of the optimal in half of the simulation runs.
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Figure 5.8: Percentage of tests in which the AverageUtility algorithm generated a coali-
tion structure with utilities 80% and 90% of the optimal.
The ResourceCentric heuristic performed well with m = 2 as can be seen in Fig. 5.9. It
provided a good solution–within 80% of the optimal–typically above 80% of the time.
In at least half of the runs, it was able to produce a solution within 90% of the optimal.
As we have seen with the other comparison algorithms though, it does not perform as
well as our approach with m = 4 and does not achieve a solution within either 80% or
90% of the optimal more than 30% of the time.
A similar assessment can be made for the ResourceCentricApprox approach presented in
Fig. 5.10. It provides a good solution in most cases for m = 2 at least 80% of the time.
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Figure 5.9: Percentage of tests in which the Resource Centric algorithm generated a
coalition structure with utilities 80% and 90% of the optimal.
It performs more comparably with our approach with m = 2 when seeking a solution
within 90% of the optimal. Again, similar to the other algorithms used for comparison,
it does not perform as well when m = 4 and in all cases except where n = 8 does not
achieve a solution within either 80% or 90% of the optimal more than 30% of the time.
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Figure 5.10: Percentage of tests in which the Resource Centric Approx. algorithm gen-
erated a coalition structure with utilities 80% and 90% of the optimal.
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Overall we can conclude in some cases the comparison algorithms provide better solu-
tions when looking at ratio to the optimal solution, but in all cases, our solution shows
better results as the number of tasks increase demonstrating better scalability.
5.2.2 Impact of Benefit and Penalty
Next we investigate how the benefit(b) and penalty(p) weights affect the solution in
terms of utility and proximity to the optimal solution. In these experiments, we chose
baseline values of b = 1.0 and p = 0.1. To understand the impact of these two values,
we ran an experiment with b values varying between 1.0 and 1.75 with increments of
0.25, and an additional experiment with p values between [0.1, 0.4] with increments of
0.1. First, we review the impact of the b values on the approximation ratios (Fig. 5.11).
Note that, in this case, p was static at 0.1. Overall, we can observe, that the change in
b does indeed impact the approximation ratio. Furthermore, we can observe, that the
baseline benefit of 1.0 produces the lowest approximation ratios. Overall, when looking
at all scenarios, a benefit of b = 1.50 offers, in general, higher approximation ratios.
At m = 4 and n = 12 the solution produces a mean approximation ratio of 0.85. The
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Number of robots
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Ut
ili
ty
 ra
tio
 to
 o
pt
im
al
m=2, b=1
m=2, b=1.25
m=2, b=1.50
m=2, b=1.75
m=4, b=1
m=4, b=1.25
m=4, b=1.50
m=4, b=1.75
Figure 5.11: Approximation Ratio to Optimal with varying benefit(b) values
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highest mean approximation ratio of 0.94 was achieved with b = 1.75 at m = 2 and
m = 4.
We now analyze the results with varying penalty values. Our results presented in Fig.
5.12 show the approximations ratios with varying p values and static b value of 1.0.
As with benefit, we observe that the penalty value does impact ratio to the optimal.
However, p = 0.1 did produce the highest singular mean approximation ratio of 0.92
at m = 2 and n = 4. When looking at the quality of solutions in all scenarios though,
a penalty of p = 0.2 results in a higher approximation ratios producing a ratio of 0.83
with m = 4 and n = 12.
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Figure 5.12: Approximation Ratio to Optimal with varying penalty(p) values
Finally, after identifying benefit and penalty values that perform well, we were interested
in reviewing the results in terms of approximation ratio when employing those values.
We can observe these results in Fig. 5.13. In this result, we compare the baseline
benefit and penalty (1.0, 0.1 respectively), to our observed better performing benefit and
penalty (1.50, 0.2 respectively). As can be seen, overall higher approximation ratios
were achieved with the latter. This is particularly notable with m = 4 and n values of
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8, 10, 12. The highest approximation ratio of 0.94 was achieved at m = 2 and n = 4.
Approximation ratios of 0.86, 0.84, 0.82 were achieved with m = 4 and n = 8, 10, 12
respectively.
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Figure 5.13: Approximation Ratio to Optimal with benefit = 1.50 and penalty = 0.2
5.2.3 Performance Comparisons
Next, we are interested in understanding how well our algorithm performs in terms of
time in comparison with the brute-force method and the four comparison algorithms.
Additionally, we are interested is how our solution scales with a large set of robots. For
our first result, as expected, when compared to the brute-force method, our algorithm
outperforms it in terms of run time. The result is shown in Fig. 5.14. With m = 2
and n = 12, our approach takes a negligible 0.028ms. While the brute-force takes
4.36ms. The difference becomes much more drastic with m = 4 where our approach
takes 0.031ms. to run while the brute force algorithm takes 59, 183.71ms.
Run time comparison result against the MaxUtility solution is shown in Fig. 5.15. As
can be observed, only in the first scenario of m = 2 and n = 4, MaxUtilty outperforms
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Figure 5.14: Run time comparison to a brute-force method [Orl02]
our solution with respect to run time. At very low numbers of tasks and robots, MaxU-
tility has very few possible coalitions to consider, and given the simplicity of the greedy
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Figure 5.15: Run time comparison to Max Utility approach
choices in this algorithm, it makes sense that this algorithm would be quick initially.
However, it quickly grows in run time as the number of robots and tasks increases due
to the exponential nature of possible coalitions to consider. With m = 4 and n = 12,
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MaxUtility takes 0.933ms, as compared to our 0.031ms, resulting in our approach being
approximately 30 times faster.
Similar results can be observed with AverageUtility as illustrated in Fig. 5.16. Again,
the first scenario of m = 2 and n = 4 shows a faster run time than our solution, but its
run time increases significantly as the number of robots and tasks increase. With m = 4
and n = 12, AverageUtility takes 1.27ms, as compared to our 0.031ms, resulting in our
approach being approximately 41 times faster.
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Figure 5.16: Run time comparison to Average Utility approach
Comparison result against the ResourceCentric algorithm is shown in Fig. 5.17. Here
we can see our solution significantly outperforms ResourceCentric. As with MaxUtil-
ity and AverageUtility, the algorithm considers all possible coalitions of a maximum
size, but performs more complex calculations taking resource constraints into account,
resulting in a slower performance. At m = 4 and n = 12, ResourceCentric takes
1336.38ms with our solution taking 0.031ms, making our solution approximately 44,500
times faster.
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Figure 5.17: Run time comparison to Resource Centric approach
The ResourceCentricApprox algorithm is modification on ResourceCentric to improve
its performance with run time. This can be observed in Fig. 5.18. We can see that it
does indeed perform much better in terms of time as compared with ResourceCentric,
however, it still does not perform as well as our solution.
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Figure 5.18: Run time comparison to Resource Centric Approx. approach
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At m = 4 and n = 12, ResourceCentricApprox takes 2.81ms. As compared with our
solution with a run time 0.031ms – making our solution approximately 90 times faster.
As stated earlier, our goal in this study is to develop a scalable algorithm that produces
near-optimal solutions. Fig. 5.19 demonstrates the scalability of our proposed solution–
the maximum run time is found to be 0.4ms. and the the mean run time was 0.192
milliseconds–with n = 100 and m = 10. A negligible number especially considering
the fact that for this particular setting, the astronomical number of possible coalition
structures is 2.75× 1093
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Figure 5.19: Run time of the proposed approach
Lastly, in this section, we consider distances the robots travel to get to their assigned
tasks. The robots want to minimize the traveled distance amount to move to a specific
task. Therefore, distance is an important performance metric. In Fig. 5.20, we see that
the total distance traveled by the robots increases linearly with more robots irrespective
of the task counts. As with less number of tasks in the environment, each robot needs
to travel more distance to reach a particular task because of the uniform distribution of
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Figure 5.20: Total distance traveled by the robots to reach the allocated tasks.
tasks and robots, it is worth noting, that with less tasks, the robots travel more. This is
consistent with the results found in [DA19]. If we observe the total distance traveled by
the robots in Fig. 5.20, we can see the maximum distance traveled was with 2 tasks and
100 robots. The mean distance traveled was 3839.647 meters and the maximum was
5673.29 meters. With 10 tasks and 100 robots, the mean distance traveled was 2572.364
meters and a maximum of 3573.26 meters.
5.2.4 Switch Rule Analysis
The number of coalition switches does not show a clear trend (Fig. 5.21). However, we
notice that the average number of switches occurred across the tested m and n values is
almost negligible and generally higher number of tasks correspond to higher number of
switches. As the robots have more coalitions to relocate to, the number of switches are
more probable with more tasks. The small, finite number of switches also demonstrates
the stability of the solution. For 2 tasks, 100 robots the mean number of switches was
0, for 4 tasks, 100 robots the mean switches was 0.2, for 6 tasks and 100 robots mean
switches was 0.55, for 8 tasks 100 robots mean switches was 1 and for 10 tasks 100
robots mean switches was 1 as well. Looking at the maximum number of switches that
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Figure 5.21: Average number of switches performed
took place for the m = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, the maximum switch counts were 1, 2, 3, 5, and
6 respectively showing again an increase in switches as the number of tasks increase.
Finally, we want to demonstrate the usefulness of the switch rule used in our model. We
see in Fig. 5.22 that generally with a higher number of coalition switches the robots
were able to increase the total utility, the maximum being 24% with six switches.
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Figure 5.22: Utility gained (%) for different number of switches.
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5.2.5 Implementation on a TurtleBot 3
Finally, we implemented the algorithm on a TurtleBot 3 robot equipped with a Raspberry
Pi 3. We used the same experiment settings when testing the scalability varying tasks
from [2, 10] and robots from [10, 100] taking the average of 20 runs. With m = 10 and
n = 100 we achieved a mean run time of .322 seconds and a maximum run time of .867
seconds. This demonstrates the scalability of the proposed algorithm on a real hardware
platform.
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Figure 5.23: Run time of proposed approach on a TurtleBot 3
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The work explored in this thesis studies the problem of coalition formation with hetero-
geneous robots for task allocation. This problem has numerous real-world applications,
however, finding the optimal solution for the studied problem is shown to be NP-Hard
in the literature. The solution presented offers a novel approach to the heterogeneous
multi-robot task allocation problem. To this end, we have proposed a hedonic coalition
formation solution using concepts from graph matching. To the best of our knowledge,
this approach is the first to solve the coalition formation problem for task allocation with
a group of heterogeneous robots using a hedonic coalition game formulation. Results
show that our proposed solution is fast, does produce near-optimal solutions, and can be
applied for a large multi-robot system as well as offering the ability to calibrate the out-
come with the benefit and penalty weights. Additionally, simulation runs on a TurtleBot
3 show that our solution can be utilized in practical application settings where comput-
ing capabilities may be limited. Comparisons against four state-of-the-art approaches
resulted in comparable outcomes in terms of utility ratio, however, our solution pro-
vided a significant improvement in run time. There are many interesting extensions to
the coalition formation problem. The increasing use of robots and robot teams across
industries lends itself to revealing new ways in which robots can coordinate and fulfill
task requirements. In the future, we can expand this work to consider inter-task de-
pendencies, as well as incorporate uncertainty into the model. Furthermore, we plan to
distribute the proposed method in order to avoid one point of failure.
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